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Little more than a month after terrorists took control of four passenger aircraft in the United States and unleashed the horror of 9/11, 50 Chechen terrorists armed with automatic weapons and carrying large quantities of explosives seized the Moscow music theater during an evening performance. The terrorists immediately threatened to kill the theater's roughly 800 occupants if the Russian government did not cease its military campaign in Chechnya. Although initial negotiations secured the release of some hostages, talks quickly stalled. Facing a protracted standoff and fearing the deaths of the remaining hostages, authorities cleared the way for action by Russian special police units. On October 26, special police units reportedly pumped an incapacitating gas into the theater. During the ensuing operation, police killed all of the terrorists and freed the majority of the hostages. However, 117 of the hostages died from the effects of the gas. (Glasser, 15) While many people credit Russia for making the most out of a no-win situation, others saw the Russian action as a potential violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This controversy continues today as "the United States itself investigates new substances that can be used to disable terrorists-perhaps even battlefield opponents." (Knickerbocker, 1) More importantly, the Moscow theater crisis, combined with knowledge gained through this elective, sparked my interest in exploring non-lethal chemical weapons. incapacitants (including military incapacitants and traditional RCAs) and anti-material agents.
(http://fas.org).
In addition to defining non-lethal weapons, DoD Directive 3000.3 has two additional purposes. One, it "establishes DoD policies and assigns responsibilities for the development and employment of NLWs." (DoDD 3000.3) Specifically, it states that NLWs [to include chemicals capable of generating incapacitating effects] should enhance the capability of US forces to accomplish the following objectives:
1) Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions.
2) Limit escalation.
3) Take military action in situations where use of lethal force is not the preferred option.
4) Better protect our forces. To that end, "DoD is studying the development and use of so-called "calmative" chemicals as well as incapacitants, malodorants, and possibly convulsants." (Knickerbocker, 1) According to the JNLWD website, the directorate sponsored a two-year non-lethal chemicals According to FM 8-9, "an incapacitant is a chemical agent which produces a temporary disabling condition that persists for hours to days after exposure to the agent has occurred (unlike that produced by riot control agents)." (FM 8-9, Para 601) The manual continues by listing five characteristics of chemical incapacitants:
1) Highly potent (an extremely small dose if effective) and logistically feasible.
2) Able to produce their effects by altering the higher regulatory activity of the central nervous system (CNS).
3) Of a duration of action lasting hours or days, rather than of a momentary or fleeing action.
4) Not seriously dangerous to life, except at doses many times the effective dose. can be argued that remifentanil is more accurately considered an RCA with an incapacitating effect (unconsciousness) versus an incapacitant as currently defined by the US military.
Unfortunately, the deaths of 117 hostages demonstrate the risks associated with the use of any non-lethal chemical on a diverse population. "One major problem is the relative level of effect among combatants and civilians-including children and the elderly who may suffer much worse effects (including death) than stronger and fitter soldiers." (Knickerbocker, 2) Fortunately, advances in pharmacology may hold the key for minimizing the risks associated with future generation RCAs. In his paper, "Non-lethal Chemical Incapacitants," Dr Kevin J. Mears discusses three distinct theories for increasing the safety margin of a given drug.
These distinct methods include: targeting drugs for a precise receptor, increasing the potency of the drug, and mixing the drug with its antidote. (Mears, 25) The first theory contends that a drug can be used like a precision munition to target a specific receptor thereby producing the desired effect while avoiding unintended side-effects or collateral damage. In the case of opioids, such a drug would produce unconsciousness without affecting receptors that depress respiration. Next, increasing the potency of a drug reduces unintended side-effects by simply reducing the amount of drug required to achieve the desired effect. Finally, advanced encapsulation techniques may make it possible to deliver the drug and its antidote simultaneously. When introduced at the same time, encapsulation techniques allow the active agents to be absorbed first followed by the antidote. In the case of an opioid, the opioid would be released first followed by a dosage of a common opioid anitdote, Nalozone. (Mears, 25) In conclusion, this paper analyzed several issues related to US military interest in nonlethal weapons with an emphasis on non-lethal chemical weapons. 
